

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.494 OF 2012

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Another ... Petitioners

Versus

Union of India & Others ... Respondents

WITH

TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.151 OF 2013

TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO.152 OF 2013

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.829 OF 2013

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.833 OF 2013

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.932 OF 2013

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.312 OF 2014

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.313 OF 2014

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.37 OF 2015

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.220 OF 2015

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO.921 OF 2015

CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.144 OF 2014 IN WP(C) 494/2012

CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.470 OF 2015 IN WP(C) 494/2012

ORDER

1. In this batch of matters, a scheme propounded by the Government of India popularly known as “Aadhaar Card Scheme” is under attack on various counts. For the purpose of this order, it is

not necessary for us to go into the details of the nature of the scheme and the various counts on which the scheme is attacked. Suffice it to say that under the said scheme the Government of India is collecting and compiling both the demographic and biometric data of the residents of this country to be used for various purposes, the details of which are not relevant at present.

2. One of the grounds of attack on the scheme is that the very collection of such biometric data is violative of the “right to privacy”. Some of the petitioners assert that the right to privacy is implied under Article 21 of the Constitution of India while other petitioners assert that such a right emanates not only from Article 21 but also from various other articles embodying the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution of India.

3. When the matter was taken up for hearing, Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General made a submission that in view of the judgments of this Court in ***M.P. Sharma & Others v. Satish Chandra & Others***, AIR 1954 SC 300 and ***Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Others***, AIR 1963 SC 1295, (decided by *Eight* and *Six* Judges respectively) the legal position regarding the existence of the fundamental right to privacy is doubtful. Further, the learned

Attorney General also submitted that in a catena of decisions of this Court rendered subsequently, this Court referred to “right to privacy”, contrary to the judgments in the abovementioned cases which resulted in a jurisprudentially impermissible divergence of judicial opinions.

“A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence an overriding power of the State for the protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject such regulation to constitutional limitations **by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy**, analogous to the American Fourth Amendment, **we have no justification to import it, into a totally different fundamental right**, by **some process of strained construction**. [See: M.P. Singh & Others v. Satish Chandra & Others, AIR 1954 SC 300, page 306 para 18]

“... Nor do we consider that Art. 21 has any relevance in the context as was sought to be suggested by learned counsel for the petitioner. As already pointed out, **the right of privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitution** and therefore the attempt to ascertain the movement of an individual which is merely a manner in which privacy is invaded is not an infringement of a fundamental right guaranteed by Part III.” [See: Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Others, AIR 1963 SC 1295, page 1303 para 20]

JUDGMENT [Emphasis supplied]

4. Learned Attorney General submitted that such impermissible divergence of opinion commenced with the judgment of this Court in **Gobind v. State of M.P. & Another**, (1975) 2 SCC 148, which formed the basis for the subsequent decision of this Court wherein the “right to privacy” is asserted or at least referred to. The most important of such cases are **R. Rajagopal & Another v. State of**

Tamil Nadu & Others, (1994) 6 SCC 632 (popularly known as *Auto Shanker's* case) and **People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India & Another**, (1997) 1 SCC 301.

5. All the judgments referred to above were rendered by smaller Benches of two or three Judges.

6. Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing for one of the respondents submitted that the decision of this Court in **Gobind** (*supra*) is not consistent with the decisions of this Court in **M.P. Sharma** and **Kharak Singh**. He submitted that such divergence is also noticed by the academicians, Shri F.S. Nariman, Senior Advocate of this Court and Shri A.M. Bhattacharjee¹, Former Chief Justice, High Court at Calcutta and High Court at Bombay.

7. Therefore, it is submitted by the learned Attorney General and Shri Venugopal that to settle the legal position, this batch of matters is required to be heard by a larger Bench of this Court as

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A.M. Bhattacharjee , *Equality, Liberty & Property under the Constitution of India*, (Eastern Law House, New Delhi, 1997)

these matters throw up for debate important questions – **(i)** whether there is any “right to privacy” guaranteed under our Constitution. **(ii)** If such a right exists, what is the source and what are the contours of such a right as there is no express provision in the Constitution adumbrating the right to privacy. It is therefore submitted that these batch of matters are required to be heard and decided by a larger bench of at least five Judges in view of the mandate contained under Article 145(3)² of the Constitution of India.

8. On behalf of the petitioners Shri Gopal Subramaniam and Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel very vehemently opposed the suggestion that this batch of matters is required to be heard by a larger bench. According to them:

(i) The conclusions recorded by this Court in **R. Rajagopal** and **PUCL** are legally tenable for the reason that the observations made in **M.P. Sharma** regarding the absence of right to privacy under our

² Article 145(3). The minimum number of Judges who are to sit for the purpose of deciding any case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution or for the purpose of hearing any reference under Article 143 shall be five:

Provided that, where the Court hearing an appeal under any of the provisions of this chapter other than Article 132 consists of less than five Judges and in the course of the hearing of the appeal the Court is satisfied that the appeal involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the appeal, such Court shall refer the question for opinion to a Court constituted as required by this clause for the purpose of deciding any case involving such a question and shall on receipt of the opinion dispose of the appeal in conformity with such opinion

Constitution are not part of ratio decidendi of that case and, therefore, do not bind the subsequent smaller Benches.

(ii) Coming to the case of **Kharak Singh**, majority in **Kharak Singh** did hold that the right of a person not to be disturbed at his residence by the State and its officers is recognized to be a part of a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 which is nothing but an aspect of privacy. The observation in para 20 of the majority judgment at best can be construed only to mean that there is no fundamental right of privacy against the State's authority to keep surveillance on the activities of a person. Even such a conclusion cannot be good law any more in view of the express declaration made by a seven-Judge bench decision of this Court in **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Another**, (1978) 1 SCC 248³.

³ Para 5. ... It was in **Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.**, AIR 1963 SC 1295 that the question as to the proper scope and meaning of the expression 'personal liberty' came up pointedly for consideration for the first time before this Court. The majority of the Judges took the view "that 'personal liberty' is used in the article as a compendious term to include within itself all the varieties of rights which go to make up the 'personal liberties' of man other than those dealt with in the several clauses of Article 19(1). In other words, while Article 19(1) deals with particular species or attributes, of that freedom, 'personal liberty' in Article 21 takes in and comprises the residue". The minority judges, however, disagreed with this view taken by the majority and explained their position in the following words: "No doubt the expression 'personal liberty' is a comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of personal liberty. It is said that the freedom to move freely is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore, the expression 'personal liberty' in Article 21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is not a correct approach. Both are independent fundamental rights, though there is overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of another. The fundamental right of life and personal liberty has many attributes and some of them are found in Article 19. If a person's fundamental right under Article 21 is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the action, but that cannot be a complete answer unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in Article 19(2) so far as the attributes covered by Article 19(1) are concerned". There can be no doubt that in view of the decision of this Court in **R. C. Cooper v. Union of India**, (1970) 2 SCC 298 the minority view must be regarded as correct and the majority view must be held to have been overruled.

(iii) They further argued that both **M.P. Sharma** (*supra*) and **Kharak Singh** (*supra*) came to be decided on an interpretation of the Constitution based on the principles expounded in **A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras**, AIR 1950 SC 27. Such principles propounded by **A.K. Gopalan** themselves came to be declared wrong by a larger Bench of this Court in **Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India**, (1970) 1 SCC 248. Therefore, there is no need for the instant batch of matters to be heard by a larger Bench.

9. It is true that **Gobind** (*supra*) did not make a clear declaration that there is a right to privacy flowing from any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution of India, but observed that “Therefore, even assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and the freedom of speech create an independent right of privacy as an emanation from them which one can characterize as a fundamental right, we do not think that the right is absolute”. This Court proceeded to decide the case on such basis.

10. However, the subsequent decisions in **R. Rajagopal** (*supra*) and **PUCL** (*supra*), the Benches were more categorical in asserting the existence of “right to privacy”. While **R. Rajagopal’s case**⁴ held that the “right to privacy” is implicit under Article 21 of the

⁴ Para 9. “Right to privacy is not enumerated as a fundamental right in our Constitution but has been inferred from Article 21.”

Constitution, **PUCI's case** held that the “right to privacy” insofar as it pertains to speech is part of fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution⁵.

11. Elaborate submissions are made at the bar by the learned counsel for the petitioners to demonstrate that world over in all the countries where Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence is followed, ‘privacy’ is recognised as an important aspect of the liberty of human beings. It is further submitted that it is too late in the day for the Union of India to argue that the Constitution of India does not recognise privacy as an aspect of the liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. At least to the extent that the right of a person to be secure in his house and not to be disturbed unreasonably by the State or its officers is expressly recognized and protected in **Kharak Singh** (*supra*) though the majority did not

⁵ Para 18. “The right to privacy — by itself — has not been identified under the Constitution. As a concept it may be too broad and moralistic to define it judicially. Whether right to privacy can be claimed or has been infringed in a given case would depend on the facts of the said case. But the right to hold a telephone conversation in the privacy of one’s home or office without interference can certainly be claimed as “right to privacy”. Conversations on the telephone are often of an intimate and confidential character. Telephone conversation is a part of modern man’s life. It is considered so important that more and more people are carrying mobile telephone instruments in their pockets. Telephone conversation is an important facet of a man’s private life. Right to privacy would certainly include telephone conversation in the privacy of one’s home or office. Telephone-tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law.


19. Right to freedom of speech and expression is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. This freedom means the right to express one’s convictions and opinions freely by word of mouth, writing, printing, picture, or in any other manner. When a person is talking on telephone, he is exercising his right to freedom of speech and expression. Telephone-tapping unless it comes within the grounds of restrictions under Article 19(2) would infract Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.”

describe that aspect of the liberty as a right of privacy, it is nothing but the right of privacy.

12. We are of the opinion that the cases on hand raise far reaching questions of importance involving interpretation of the Constitution. What is at stake is the amplitude of the fundamental rights including that precious and inalienable right under Article 21. If the observations made in **M.P. Sharma** (*supra*) and **Kharak Singh** (*supra*) are to be read literally and accepted as the law of this country, the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India and more particularly right to liberty under Article 21 would be denuded of vigour and vitality. At the same time, we are also of the opinion that the institutional integrity and judicial discipline require that pronouncement made by larger Benches of this Court cannot be ignored by the smaller Benches without appropriately explaining the reasons for not following the pronouncements made by such larger Benches. With due respect to all the learned Judges who rendered the subsequent judgments - where right to privacy is asserted or referred to their Lordships concern for the liberty of human beings, we are of the humble opinion that there appears to be certain amount of apparent unresolved contradiction in the law declared by this Court.

13. Therefore, in our opinion to give a quietus to the kind of controversy raised in this batch of cases once for all, it is better that the ratio decidendi of **M.P. Sharma** (*supra*) and **Kharak Singh** (*supra*) is scrutinized and the jurisprudential correctness of the subsequent decisions of this Court where the right to privacy is either asserted or referred be examined and authoritatively decided by a Bench of appropriate strength.

14. We, therefore, direct the Registry to place these matters before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.



.....J.
(J. Chelameswar)

JUDGMENT
.....J.
(S.A. Bobde)

.....J.
(C. Nagappan)

New Delhi
August 11, 2015