Limitation u/s 34 of Arbitration Act commences on disposal of application u/s 33 by Arbitral Tribunal – SC

Limitation for filing application u/s 34 of Arbitration Act commence from date on which application u/s 33 is disposed of by Arbitral Tribunal.

In a recent judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that once jurisdiction under Section 33 of Arbitration Act is formally invoked and such proceedings are entertained by the Arbitral Tribunal, the limitation for filing an application under Section 34 would commence only from the date on which such request is disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal. 

ABCAUS Case Law Citation:
5162 (2026) (06) abacus.in SC

Important Case Laws relied upon by Parties:
State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co.
Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v. Sandeep Gurav

The Central Government, under Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956, (1956 Act) acquired land belonging to Respondent. The competent authority determined the compensation under Section 3G(1) of the 1956 Act.

However, the NHAI invoked the remedy of Arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the 1956 Act. The Arbitrator redetermined the market value of agricultural land and non-agricultural land. However, the High Court set aside the Arbitral Award and remitted the matter to the Arbitrator for de novo consideration

Pursuant to the remand, the Arbitrator conducted fresh proceedings and passed an Award by granting the benefit of Section 23(1A), 23(2), 28 and Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The NHAI filed application under Section 33(1)(a) of the Act before Arbitrator seeking correction of Arbitral Award, inter alia on the ground that grant of additional market value under Section 23 and interest under Section 34 of the 1894 Act was not legally sustainable. The respondent also filed an application for enhancement of the award. However, the Arbitrator by a common order dismissed the applications filed under Section 33 of the Act by the NHAI as well as by the Respondent. However, the certified copy of the said order was received by the NHAI after more than two months.

Subsequently, the NHAI filed applications under Section 34 of the Act before the District Court for setting aside the Arbitral award along with applications seeking condonation of delay. However, the respondent raised an objection contending that the applications under Section 34 of the Act were filed with delay which was beyond the condonable period of delay of 120 days, as provided, in proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act.

The District & Sessions Judge, condoned the delay in filing the applications under Section 34 of the Act and allowed the same. The Respondent challenged the aforesaid order before Hon’ble High Court in a Writ Petition.

The High Court held that Section 33(1)(a) of the Act permits correction of computation, clerical or typographical errors or errors of similar nature. It was further held that the prayer made in the application filed by the NHAI seeking modification of the Arbitral Award did not fall within the purview of Section 33(1)(a) of the Act and hence the same was not maintainable.

The High Court concluded that the benefit of limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act was not available and, therefore, the limitation could not be computed from the date of disposal of such applications.

Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court dismissing the appeal, the Appellant filed an appeal before Hon’ble Supreme Court.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that an application under Section 33 of the Act is required to be made within a period of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the award. Where a request under Section 33 of the Act has been made, the limitation for filing an application under Section 34 of the Act shall be reckoned from the date on which such request is disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal and it does not distinguish between the applications which are ultimately allowed or dismissed.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that once proceedings under Section 33 are initiated and entertained by the Arbitral Tribunal, the award remains subject to the limited jurisdiction of the tribunal for correction, interpretation, or supplementation as contemplated under the provision. So long as such proceedings remain pending, the parties cannot be compelled to institute proceedings under Section 34 merely as a matter of abundant caution. The parties can effectively pursue their remedy under Section 34 only upon conclusion of the proceedings under Section 33. Consequently, the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) can start only from the date on which the proceedings under Section 33 are disposed of.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court opined that the interpretation adopted by the High Court would defeat the scheme and object of the Act. If parties are compelled to institute proceedings under Section 34 during the pendency of proceedings, under Section 33 merely as a matter of abundant caution, it would result in multiplicity of proceedings and procedural uncertainty.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court also clarified that where applications under Section 33 are found to be sham, frivolous, or mala fide or solely filed for the purpose of defeating limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act, the courts would be justified in imposing exemplary and punitive costs, as maintaining the balance between preserving legitimate remedies and preventing abuse of process is fundamental to effective administration of justice.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court further noted that the issue was no longer res integra. This Hon’ble Supreme Court after examining Sections 33 and 34(3) of the Act has held that for the purposes of computation of limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act, it is the date of disposal of the application under Section 33 of the Act that would earmark the starting point of limitation for filing an application under Section 34 of the Act.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court also noted that it was not in dispute that the applications under Section 34 were filed after certified copy of the common order disposing of the applications under Section 33 was received by the Appellant. Thus, even reckoning limitation from the date of receipt of the order disposing of the applications under Section 33, the applications under Section 34 of the Act were instituted within the period contemplated under Section 34(3) of the Act.

Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court and order passed by the District and Sessions Judge condoning the delay in filing the applications under Section 34 of the Act, was restored.

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